Nothing here is yours.
One finding is shared with your sending platform. The mechanical half is done and the judgement is still yours.
19 DNS lookups24 blocklists askedno entriesno score, ever
read from DNS, quoted verbatim
- SPF
- ~all
- DMARC
- p=reject
- DKIM
- 1 selector
- BIMI
- optional
- MX
- Microsoft 365
- LISTS
- 24 asked
4 Aug 2026 · no score, no grade, nothing inferred
Who this domain authorises
Your sender list is held by Valimail
include:%{i}._ip.%{h}._ehlo.%{d}._spf.vali.email
The record is built from SPF macros, so the senders are resolved per message at delivery time and are genuinely not readable from DNS — not by us, and not by any other checker that tells you it expanded your SPF. Whoever administers Valimail holds the answer to which platforms may send as you; this page can only report what your own record says.
selector1._domainkey is Microsoft 365, which is where staff read mail. It says nothing about where campaigns leave from, and a checker that counts it as your sending platform has told you about your inbox, not your list.
This is what your DNS authorises, not proof of what you send. A domain can authorise a platform it stopped paying for two years ago. Only a real message names the address that actually sent your campaign.
Whose job each one is
- 3fine
- 1context
Looks fine
present, ending ~all
Soft fail. Accepted everywhere, though -all is stronger once your sender list is complete.
v=spf1 include:%{i}._ip.%{h}._ehlo.%{d}._spf.vali.email ~allLooks fine
present with p=reject
A policy that actually instructs receivers, which is more than most senders publish.
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email
From DMARC p=none is monitoring, not enforcementSee what this looks like →
Looks fine
keys published on 1 selector
A key existing is not the same as working. Read a real received header and check the d= value matches your before you call this done.
selector1._domainkey (Microsoft 365)
From DKIM passing is not DKIM alignedSee what this looks like →
Part platform, part you
The key is your platform's to publish and it has. Whether it signs the domain in your is yours to confirm, and cannot show it — send one campaign to yourself and look for =pass header.d=britishairways.com in the Authentication-Results header.
Context
Receiving mail via Microsoft 365
Where you receive mail says nothing about where you send it. Marketing sends usually leave through a different platform entirely.
britishairways-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
Blocklists
Nothing has an entry for you.
24 lists asked0 with an entry
britishairways.com is not on any of the 24 lists that answered us today. That is the whole result — there is no score, and a clean answer is allowed to be short.
Which lists, and which would not answer
- SpamCopanswered
- PSBLanswered
- Mailspikeanswered
- Spam Eating Monkeyanswered
- blocklist.deanswered
- 0SPAManswered
- InterServeranswered
- SPFBLanswered
- GBUdb Truncateanswered
- s5h.netanswered
- ZapBLanswered
- SWINOGanswered
- Kemptanswered
- Anonmailsanswered
- Fabelanswered
- NoSolicitadoanswered
- Schulteanswered
- JIPPGanswered
- UCEPROTECT Level 1answered
- UCEPROTECT Level 2answered
- UCEPROTECT Level 3answered
- Backscattereranswered
- SEM Backscatteranswered
- URIBLanswered
Each of these answered an entry it is required to publish, and one it is required not to, before we believed anything it said about you. A list that fails either is reported as unanswered rather than as clean — because a blocklist that declines to reply looks exactly like one giving you the all-clear. How we choose them.
Putting this in a client report? Embed a live, dated badge that re-checks itself.
Watch this domain
One email if authentication DNS for britishairways.com actually changes. Same list as rule alerts — one inbox, one promise.